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Courts-martial are instituted for the trial of moral and mil-
itary offenses. These courts existed as early as the reign of
James II, and" probably had their origin in the ancient Courts of
Chivalry. The latter have fallen entirely into disuse. The last
trial before a Court of Chivalry was that of Lord Audley in
1497, but the trial of the Earl of Warwick in 1499 took place
before the Court of the Lord High Steward.
Bouvier defines a court-martial as a "military or naval tri-
bunal, which has jurisdiction of offenses against the law of the
service, military or naval, in which the offender is engaged."'
Greenleaf says: "A court-martial is a court of limited and spe-
cial jurisdiction."'2 "It has all the elements of a court. It has
judges tQ hear the evidence and determine the facts, and apply
the law. It has parties, prosecutor and defendant. It has
pleading and formal trial, renders judgment and issues process
to enforce it. In short, it does everything within the sphere of
its jurisdiction which any judicial tribunal can do to administer
justice." 3
The constitutional power, authority and jurisdiction of. a
court-martial is found in article I, section 8 of the United States
Constitution, as follows: "The Congress shall have power . .. ;
12. To raise and support armies . . . ; 14. To make rules
for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces,
and . . . ; 18. To make all laws which shall be necessary
and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers,
and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the govern-
ment of the United States, or in any department or officer
thereof."
The power of the court-martial was formerly more exten-
sive than now, and was often exercised in a more arbitrary man-
ner. Blackstone denounced this unlimited power by contrasting
it with the certainty and precision of the common law, and ex-
pressed his sympathy 'with those who were subject to its juris-
diction in the following terms: "How much, therefore, it is to
be regretted that a set of men whose bravery has so often pre-
served the liberties of their country should be reduced to a state
1 Bouvier Law Dictionary.
23 Greenleaf on Evidence, 47.
3 People v. Van A71en, 55 N. Y. 31.
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of servitude in the midst of a nation of freemen. " 4 In those
days the civil courts were ever jealous of the powers exercised by
the military courts. 5o jealous were they at one period in
England's history of this power, which they regarded as
usurped, that the members of a court-martial who passed sen-
tence and brought about the execution of a soldier or civilian
were regarded as murderers, and were in some instances tried
and convicted of murder. The power of these courts has been
very much restricted and limited since that period.
The law governing courts-martial is found in the statutory
enactmentsof Congress, particularly the Articles of War,5 in the
regulations and instructions sanctioned by the President for the
government of the army and navy and in the customary military
law.6 By the act of August 23, 18427 the army regulations were
made a part of the law of the land. However, as In re Fair.s
the finding and judgment of "not guilty" by a military court-
martial was not a bar to the prosecution of the same act by the
civil authorities. This goes to the extent that the consruction
placed by a commanding officer of a military department upon
the Articles of War and the rules and regulations promulgated
by the President through tlie secretary of war is not binding
upon the judiciary.
The power vested in the military courts is not a part of the
judicial power of the United States within the meaning of the
Constitution, and such courts are not included in the judicial
department of the government. In the case of Kurtz v. Moffitt,9
one Kurtz, a deserter from the army of the United States, was,
without any warrant or express authority, arrested by Moffitt
and Fields, police officers of the city of San Francisco, and citi-
zens of the state of California, and held by them for the purpose
of being delivered to the military authorities of the United
States and to be tried according to the laws of the United States.
Kurtz claimed immunity from being arrested for a military
crime by- persons not military officers, and having no express au-
thority from the United States or from such officers to arrest
4 1 B1. 416.
U. S. Rev. St. Sees. 1342 and 1624 as Amd.
Ex P. Reed, 100 U. S. 13.
15 U. S. St. at L. 510.
'100 Fed. 149.
'115 U. S. 487.
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him. Here the Supreme Court ruled that a police offices of a
state, or a private citizen, has no authority as such without any
warrant or military order, to arrest and detain a deserter from
the army of the United States. The court said in rendering
this decision: "The rules of the common law that a peace officer
or a private citizen may arrest a felon without a warrant, has
been generally held by the courts of the several states to be in
force in cases of felony punishable by the civil tribunals. But,
that rule has'never, so far as we are informed, been judicially
extended to the case of an offender against the military law
punishable exclusively by courts-martial.' 10
In the matter of territorial jurisdiction of a court-martial
the law imposes no limitation. The jurisdiction of such courts
extends over the whole territory of the United States; and where
an army is within the territory of another government, whether
in time of peace or war, its courts-martial may exercise jurisdic-
tion over all persons and offenses subject thereto wherever the
army may happen to be at the time.1 1
A soldier of the United States convicted of murder in Ten-
nessee, by a court-martial, while that state was in the military
occupation of the United'States, was not subsequently amenable
to the laws of that state then in force, for the same offense, for
the reason that the court-martial had exclusive jurisdiction to
try and punish offenses of every grade committed by persons in
the military service while the army was in enemy's territory.12
The offenses within the jurisdiction of the courts-martial
are those set out by the Articles of War or by the several statu-
tory provisions. These offenses may be classed as purely mili-
tary, or those which are also offenses against the general law.
However, military courts (with special reference to military
commissions) are not tribunals for the adjusting of controver-
sies between private individuals in regard to property. A con-
troversy between husband and wife in regard to alimony does
not fall within its jurisdiction.13 Courts-martial are supreme
while acting within the sphere of their exclusive jurisiction.
14
-0Fresh v. Paayne, 43 Barb. 569;Dynes v. Hoover, 20 How (U. S.)
625.
,Winthrop Military L. (2nd Ed.) 104.
Coleman v. Tenn., 97 U. S. 509.
"State v. Sti~man, 7 Cold (Tenn.) 340
I"ICarter v. Roberts, 177 U. S. 496; Dynes v. Hoover, supra (10); U.
S. v. Maney, 61 Fed. 140
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The jurisdiction of a court-martial may be greatly extended
in time of war both as to persons and offenses. It is provided by
section 30 of aii Act of Congress, approved March 3, 1862,
chapter 75: "That in time of war, insurrection or rebellion, mur-
der, assault and battery with an intent to kill, manslaughter,
wounding, shooting or stabbing with an intent to commit mur-
der, robbery, arson, burglary, rape, assault and battery with an
intent to commit rape, and larceny, shall be punishable by the
sentence of a General Court-Martial or Military Commission,
when committed by persons who are in the military service of
the United States, and subject to the Articles of War; and the
punishment of such offenses shall never be less than those in-
flicted by the state, territory or district in which they may have
been committed."
Section 38 of the same act provides:
"That all persons who, in time of war or rebellion against
the supreme authority of the United States, shall be found lurk-
ing or acting as spies in or about any fortifications, posts, quar-
ters or encampments, of any of the armies of the United States,
or elsewhere, shall be tried by a general court-martial, or mili-
tary commission, and shall, upon conviction, suffer death."
A court-martial is of a temporary and special jurisdiction.
In this respect it differs widely from the civil courts. When
the object of its creation is accomplished it ceases to exist. "A
court-martial organized under the laws of the United States is
a court of special and limited jurisdiction. Its authority is
statutory and must be strictly pursued," says Mir. Chief Justice
Waits in Ruizkle v. U. S. 15 The common law knew no distinc-
tion between citizens and soldiers, so that if a life guard deserted
he could only be sued for a breach of contract; and if he struck
his officer he was only liable to an indictment or an action of
battery.16
The secretaries of war and navy have the power to convene
general courts-martial; the former as the regular constitutional
organ of the President for the administration of the military
affairs of the nation, and the latter by authority of statute.17
The commanding officer of an army, an army corps, a division,
or a separate brigade, or the superintendent of a military
5122 U. S. 543.
1 2 Campbell's, Lives of Ch. J., 91.
"35 U. S. St. L. 621, 131 sec. 10.
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academy may convene general courts-martial whenever necess-
ary. In the naval service the power of convening general courts-
martial is possessed by the commander-in-chief of a fleet or
squadron and the commanding officer of any naval station be-
yond the continental limits of the United States.' 8 The Presi-
dent has the authority to appoint general courts-martial in every
case where that power is granted to general officers even though
the power is not conferred upon him specially: In Swaim v. U.
, 19 Mr. Justice Shiras said (in quoting Mr. Justice Drake in an
earlier decision) : "As commander-in-chief the President is au-
thorized to give orders to his subordinates, and the convening of
a court-martial is simply giving an order to certain officers to
assemble as a court, and, when so assembled, to exercise certain
powers conferred upon them by the Articles of War."
Statutes of the various states provide for courts-martial for
the trial of members of the militia. Jn People v. Daniel,20 it
was held that courts-martial were necessary incidents to the
"discipline" of the state militia and the provisions of the Con-
stitution of the--tate of New York requiring the militia to be
"armed and disciplined." A militiaman may be tried and pun-
ished in accordance with the federal statutes when called into
actual service by the governor in pursuance of an order of the
President. This question was settled in Martin v. Mott.
21
Great stress is laid upon the necessity of legally convening
and organizing the court-martial. If not legally convened and
organized its acts are void. A.court-martial entirely composed
of officers in the regular army of the United States is without
jurisdiction to try an officer or soldier of other forces when con-
vened for that sole purpose.22 Except officers of the marine
corps, detached for service with the army by order of the Pres-
ident, may be associated with officers of the regular army or the
forces of the marine corps so detached.
23
A general court-martial may consist of any number of offi-
cers from five to thirteen, inclusive. A court-martial of less than
thirteen members is not a lawful court if. that number can be
"See (17) supra.
165 U. S. 553.
50 N. Y. 274.
2112 Wheat. 19: Houstin. v. Moore, 5 Wheat. 1.
=186 U. S. 49.
2U. S. Rev. St. 1342 art. 78.
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convened without manifest injury to the service. Attorney-
General Wirt suggested that, in every case of life and death, at
least the President should be satisfied of the manifest injury
which the service would have sustained in convening a court of
thirteen before he gives his sanction to a sentence of death by a
smaller number.24 When the number of members present is not
less than five the jurisdiction of the court-martial will not be
impaired.25 But where the court is of the minimum number, the
incompetency of one member renders the proceedings void ab
declared void, one member of the court being not competent to
initio. In U. S. v. Brown,2 6 the proceedings of the court were
sit. In this instance the membership was thus reduced below
the minimum required by law.
In the foregoing article I have endeavored to give only a
general idea of the history, jurisdiction and composition of
courts-martial, dealing almost exclusively with general courts-
martial. A more detailed exposition would set forth the various
kinds of courts-martial in addition to the general, as special and
summary, the organization and jurisdiction of each, the proced-
ure before and during trial, with special reference to the rules
governing the admission and exclusion of evidence, and the
carrying into effect of sentence.
H.&w HOBART GRooms.
241 Op. Atty.-Gen. 229.
7 Op. Atty.-Gen. 338.
=206 U. S. 240.
